Clear advice from service chiefs missing
The constitutional framework clearly lays down responsibilities of the Raksha Mantri, the defence secretary and the service chiefs. The first part of this analysis points out that the MoD can function effectively only on the basis of dynamic coordination between its civilian and military elements N.N. Vohra
Defence Minister AK Antony and the service chiefs paying homage at the Amar Jawan Jyoti. There is a crucial need to ensure jointness and to evolve a closely integrated defence plan with a long term perspective
Defence Minister AK Antony and the service chiefs paying homage at the Amar Jawan Jyoti. There is a crucial need to ensure jointness and to evolve a closely integrated defence plan with a long term perspective
OVER the past two decades, a growing number of former senior armed forces officers have been writing on issues relating to higher defence management. A criticism has been recurringly raised that impediments arise in functioning of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) because the civilian officers posted in the ministry exercise authority which far exceeds their mandate.
In any discussion on defence management it is extremely important to note that in our democratic parliamentary framework the power lies with the elected representatives, from among whom Cabinet ministers are appointed. The ministers are responsibile for managing the affairs of their departments and decide all important matters except those which are required to be submitted to the Cabinet, Cabinet Committee on Security, Prime Minister, President or other specified authorities. The civil servants working in these departments are the tools for assisting the ministers in finalising policies and then ensuring that the same are effectively executed.
Constitutional framework
Civil-military discordFrequently voiced dissatisfaction that civilians posted in the MoD do not have adequate past experience of working in this arena or long enough tenures to gain specialisationSome commentators allege that the role of political leaders has been hijacked by IAS officers and what obtains in the MoD today is bureaucratic control and not civilian political control of the military
A factor which invariably came in the way of arriving at adequately prompt and satisfactory solutions in troubled times was failure to present to the Raksha Mantri clear cut options based on the advice from the Chiefs of Staff Committee
The proposal to create the post of a Chief of Defence Staff is hanging fire due to lack of collective support by the three services and failure to secure approval for want of political consensus
The Constitution lays down the framework within which the union government and the states are required to carry out their respective responsibilities. List 1 of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution states that the union government is responsible for the “Defence of India and every part thereof”. The supreme command of the armed forces rests in the President. The responsibility for national defence vests with the Cabinet, which is discharged through the MoD that provides the policy framework for the armed forces to carry out their duties. The Raksha Mantri heads this ministry, the principal task of which is to obtain policy directions of the government on all defence and security related matters and see that these are implemented by the service headquarters and allied establishments.
Further, the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules state that all business allotted to government departments shall be disposed off by, or under the directions of, the minister-in-charge of the department, and in each department the secretary shall be the administrative head thereof, and shall be responsible for the proper transaction of business. Thus, constitutionally, the overall responsibility for the MoD’s functioning rests entirely on the Raksha Mantri and that for ensuring the business of the Department of Defence is transacted in conformity with the Rules is vested in the defence secretary.
In this context, the MoD is clearly responsible to the government for all matters relating to the defence of India and the armed forces and, further, as provided under the Defence Services Regulations, the chiefs of the three services are responsible to the President through the MoD for the command, discipline, recruitment, training, administration and preparation of war of their respective service. The civilian face of the MoD is represented by the Raksha Mantri, his junior ministerial colleagues, defence secretary and other civil servants.
The structure and functioning of the MoD has undergone very significant changes after the amendment of business rules and the establishment of the Integrated Army, Navy, Air and Defence Staff Headquarters of the MoD. The Intergrated Headquarters (IHQ) are involved with policy formulation regarding the defence of India and the armed forces, and are responsible for providing executive directions in the implementation of MoD’s policies.
Issues of contention
A frequently voiced dissatisfaction is that the civilians posted in the MoD do not have adequate experience of working in this arena and also do not have long enough tenures to gain specialisation for effectively dealing with military matters. This perception is largely true. Perhaps only a few among them, particularly officers at joint secretary level, may have done previous stints in the defence or home ministries. As regards tenures, while the Central Secretariat Service officers may serve for long periods, the deputationist officers appointed to director and joint secretary level posts enjoy average tenures of 5 years. It is necessary to remedy this situation.
Some commentators allege that the role of political leaders has been hijacked by IAS officers and what obtains in the MoD today is “bureaucratic control and not civilian political control of the military”. It has been further argued that the civil services have succeeded in having their own way essentially because the political leadership has little or no past experience or expertise in handling defence matters, have little interest, and lack the will to support reforms in the defence management apparatus. This line of thinking is carried forward to conclude that as the MoD does not have the confidence and capability to adjudicate on the competing claim and demands made by the individual services, each service largely follows it own course.
There cannot be any debate about the crucial need for the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) to work overtime for securing a level of jointness which will enable critical inter-se prioritisation of the varied demands projected by the individual services and based thereon, to evolve a closely integrated defence plan that has a 10-15 year perspective.
Some former senior officers opine that issues about civilian control have arisen essentially because successive Raksha Mantris have chosen not to exercise requisite influence and control and have been particularly amiss in never questioning the chiefs about the logic and assumptions relating to the execution of military plans, as this vital responsibility has been left entirely to the service headquarters. Operation Blue Star, Exercise Brass Tacks, Exercise Checker Board, IPKF operations in Sri Lanka and several other events are cited as examples of serious avoidable failures which happened because of the lack of clarity about the goals to be achieved and on account of major gaps in the operational plans.
It is regrettable that the records relating to past operations and wars remain clothed in secrecy, having the adverse consequence of successive generations of military officers being denied the opportunity of learning from past mistakes. This issue was taken note of by the Group of Ministers on National Security and a committee set up by the Raksha Mantri in 2002 to review the publication of military histories clearly recommended that histories of the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars be published without delay.
The essence of coordination
Some commentators have gone to the extent of taking the position that difficulties arise in the functioning of the MoD because Raksha Mantris do not have past exposure to military matters. This is not a well founded notion. Having faced two world wars, USA and some European nations were compelled to enfore conscription for two to three generations of their youth. Consequently, for many years, a number of ministers in these countries had earlier served in the armed forces and had been directly exposed to military functioning. Today, however, even in these countries there may now be no elected person having exposure to military service. In India, we have never had any conscription and military service is voluntary. It would, therefore, not be logical to suggest that our Raksha Mantris should necessarily have been exposed to military matters.
It is disturbing to hear angry statements that the MoD has not been devoting timely attention to dealing with its tasks. During my days in the ministry I worked with eight Raksha Mantris, of whom five were the Prime Ministers, and can say without any hesitation, that even the Prime Ministers who held charge of the MoD remained most seriously concerned about national security issues while being overburdened with a horde of crisis situations on varied fronts. However, a factor which invariably came in the way of arriving at adequately prompt and satisfactory solutions, such as may have been possible in those troubled times, was our failure to present to the Raksha Mantri clear cut options based on the advice received from the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). In this context it is relevant to recall the virtually established practice that the chiefs would raise no significant matters in the Raksha Mantri’s Monday morning meetings but seek to discuss substantive issues only in one-on-one meetings with him and, if possible, the Prime Minister. Whenever the chiefs met the Raksha Mantri together and presented him with even a broadly agreed approach, there was no delay in the required decisions being promptly arrived at and speedily promulgated. I would reiterate the importance of ensuring that the MoD functions on the basis of dynamic coordination between the civilian and military elements.
In the late 1980s the MoD’s functioning was, among other factors, most adversely affected by a severe financial crisis in the country. Reckoning the understandable worries and tensions within the ministry, Prime Minister VP Singh, who was also the our Raksha Mantri, set up a Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE) to review the existing defence set-up and recommend rationalisation of expenditure. I was then the defence secretary and Arun Singh, the committee’s chairman consulted me informally about the recommendations evolved by CDE. I gave him my personal opinion that while the proposal to create the proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) set-up for advising the Raksha Mantri on all military matters would necessarily have to be processed for consideration at the political level, there appeared no difficulty whatsoever in implementing all other recommendations for enforcing economy, closing redundant ordnance factories, rationalising the finance wing functioning and enlarging the existing administrative and financial delegations. The COSC, after examining the CDE report, communicated that none of the committee’s recommendations would be accepted if the government did not accept the recommended restructuring of the COSC. To secure better resource management, the ministry went ahead and ordered financial delegation up to army command and equivalent, placed internal financial advisers in each service headquarters and directed several other useful changes.
Revamping defence management
The defence reforms process did not move much further till May 1998 when the successful nuclear tests at Pokhran catapulted India into the exclusive club of nuclear power states. This sudden development cast very high responsibility on the government, particularly the MoD, and led to the establishment of various arrangements and structures for handling strategic issues and decisions. The National Security Council was set up in November 1998 and a National Security Advisor (NSA) was appointed. Then, in summer 1999 came the Kargil War, which took the country entirely by surprise and generated grave misgivings about the failure of the defence apparatus and serious concerns about the army’s preparedness. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) was set up to undertake a thorough review of the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in Kargil and to recommend measures for safeguarding national security against such intrusions. The KRC report was speedily examined by a Group of Ministers (GoM) chaired by then Home Minister LK Advani. For undertaking national security reforms the GoM set up four task forces, one of which was on higher defence management. Among the foremost recommendations made was creation of the Integrated Defence Staff to improve the planning process, promote “jointness” among the armed forces and provide single point military advice to the government.
While the GoM endorsed almost all the major recommendations of the task force on higher defence management, the proposal regarding the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff got involved in the lack of collective support by the three services and failed to secure approval for want of political consensus.
A National Security Doctrine is Imperative
The concluding part of the analysis on civil-military relations argues that India’s national security concerns demand that all interests and all institutions of national power are brought to work most closely together to further the country’s interest and build a militarily and economically strong nation that enjoys the world’s trust and respect
N.N. Vohra
IAF helicopters bearing the National and the service ensigns fly past over Rajpath on Republic Day. Individual services need to close ranks and get collectively concerned about the major threats and formidable challenges that the country faces
IAF helicopters bearing the National and the service ensigns fly past over Rajpath on Republic Day. Individual services need to close ranks and get collectively concerned about the major threats and formidable challenges that the country faces
OVER the years, continuing efforts have been made by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to promote jointness through integration of the planning, training and other systems so that, progressively, a tri-service approach could get fully established. However, certain issues continue to affect the efficient functioning of the defence apparatus:
There must be no further delay in finalising the National Security Doctrine, on the basis of which integrated threat assessments can be made.
While some improvements have been achieved in the past years, the MoD must enforce strict measures to ensure that the DRDO, ordnance factories, defence public sector undertakings and other concerned agencies function efficiently to deliver supplies and services as per the envisaged time and cost schedules. Prolonged delays cause serious difficulties for the armed forces and large economic losses as the lack of certainty about supplies from indigenous sources compels expensive imports.
While there have been notable advances in the rationalisation of the procurement policies and procedures, there is still need to ensure against prolonged acquisition proceedings as such delays altogether nullify the “make or buy” approaches.
The individual services enjoy the autonomy of taking decisions to make their own selections of weapons, equipment and systems. The Integrated Service Headquarters must take effective steps to establish a tri-service approach in regard to such decisions as doing so will engender very significant financial savings.
Defence planning process has still to get established. The X and XI Plans were implemented without receiving formal approvals. While the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan has since been finalised, it is still viewed as a totalling up of the wish lists of the individual services. The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) must devote urgent attention towards finalising a fully integrated defence plan with at least a 10-15 year perspective.
The services enjoy the authority of virtually settling their own manpower policies. The pro-rata percentage representation of arms and services in the Army needs to be modified as it is virtually a “quota system” which breeds group loyalties and cuts at the very roots of jointness within the service.
While the functioning of the defence apparatus has been getting steadily refined, the continuing lack of consensus among the three services is thwarting the achievement of the vital objective of “jointness”. A number of joint service institutions have come into existence in the post Kargil War period. Among the new institutions, frequent references are made to the IDS, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Andaman & Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command. While it may be far too early to rejoice over these inter-agency institutions, it is disconcerting to learn that the individual services are not doing all that is required to see that these get fully established without facing delays and difficulties. A former Army Chief is quoted to say that the IDS is “a redundancy in military bureaucracy”; the founder Director of DIA is quoted to bring out that “the DIA cannot deliver as the intelligence agencies of the three services feel threatened by it” and about the IDS it is stated that “the services will never allow this body to function as they feel threatened that it will start examining the basis of their budgetary proposals, acquisition plans and force structures”.
Consequences of economic meltdown
The time has come for the individual services to close their ranks and get collectively concerned about the major threats and formidable challenges which we face in our close neighbourhood and beyond. The global security environment is continuing to become growingly complex and huge uncertainties loom large on various fronts.
Our military has to be also concerned about the consequences of the economic meltdown and the strong likelihood of the allocations for defence facing a significant decline. In this scenario, to prepare for successfully meeting future challenges, it is of the highest importance that the individual services shed all reservations and establish meaningful jointness. A truly tri-service approach will reduce functional overlaps, wasteful duplications and redundancies. The IDS have already promulgated a joint doctrine for the armed forces, which is presently undergoing revision because of the differing views of the service headquarters on several issues. Any delay in this regard would come in the way of the armed forces preparing themselves fully for delivering an effective response when any emergency arises in the future.
The defence ministry must realise the need to keep a very close watch on the rising cost of maintaining the military apparatus and ensuring that the high cost of the longer term acquisitions can be met from within the future availability of resources. Urgent attention needs being paid to reducing dependency on imports. This would require a very vigorous revving up of the ongoing indigenisation programmes. In the years past, only the Navy initiated systematic steps to foster indigenisation of their major platforms and systems and deserve all praise for the wonderful outcomes which they have already been able to achieve.
It also needs being noted that India is not the only country which is engaged in dealing with problems relating to the functioning of the defence management apparatus. Many democracies have been facing such problems and, benefitting from their own past experiences, several countries have established strong parliamentary oversight bodies to monitor all important issues relating to their armed forces. Some countries have even inducted external experts to monitor their ongoing defence reform processes.
Evolving a model for jointness
India cannot and must not be left behind in doing all that needs to be done for strengthening and enhancing our national security interests. We need to develop our own model of defence management which vigorously promotes and sustains military professionalism while being fully in tune with our constitutional framework and in harmony with our glorious traditions and soldiering. The model to be evolved should also not be excessively encumbered with varied hierarchical fixations which are rooted in our colonial past.
Considering the threats and challenges which loom on our horizon it is extremely important that our higher defence management structures are founded in the need to maintain a sensitive balance between the civil and military components and, side by side, ensuring that the entire military apparatus functions strictly within the parameters of “jointness”.
It would be an ideal situation if the service chiefs were to collaborate closely and for the Chiefs of Staff Committee to itself take the various required decisions to pave the way for the future and establish jointness, brick upon brick. In the past over two decades many useful opportunities were lost because of the lack of convergence in the views of the service headquarters.
If jointness and a tri-service approach cannot be achieved soon enough then, perhaps, the only option left may be to proceed towards replacing the existing single service Acts by an Armed Forces Act which would lay a statutory basis for achieving jointness and delineating the roles, duties and missions of the armed forces, as also the procedures and modalities relating to the functioning of the defence apparatus. In this context, it may not be out of place to recall that the US achieved its objectives by promulgating the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986, after nearly four decades of experimentation under the aegis of its National Security Act. More recently, because of the serious budgetary problems faced by the country, UK has been devoting a high level of attention to reforms in its defence management apparatus. In this context, the Levene Report has sought to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of ministers, civilian officers and the military at the policy, strategic and operational levels.
A dedicated security cadre
In so far as the tenure of civilians working in the MoD are concerned, a dedicated security administration cadre should be established by drawing in the best available talent from the civil services, defence services, DRDO, science and technology, information and communication technology, broadcasting and media, et al. This dedicated cadre should enjoy open ended tenures and those found fit should be enabled to develop specialisation in dealing with security related matters and be deployed in the MoD, Ministry of Home Affairs, Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau, National Security Council secretariat and other security management related areas for their entire careers. This recommendation is contained in the Report of the Task Force on Internal Security (2000). It was accepted by the Group of Ministers (GoM) and after hearing it, the GoM had gone further and added that as “the assignments in these ministries/agencies are perceived as exacting and unattractive, the members of such a pool should, therefore, be appropriately compensated by provision of non-monetary incentives”. It is time to resurrect and speedily implement this decision of the GoM.
Another factor noted by the GoM was related to the marked difference in the perception of roles between the civil and military officers. A task force was set up to work out the curricula for organising a continuing Joint Civil and Military Training Programme on National Security, which would be undergone by Brigadier and Major General and equivalent rank officers, IAS, IPS, IFS, central police forces and, as the training settled down, participants would also be drawn from the media, industry and other arenas. On the basis of this task force’s recommendations the first two-week programme commenced at the IAS Training Academy at Mussoorie, in February 2003. This programme has been successfully continuing for over a decade now and the 20th course commenced at Mussoorie in November 2013. It would be beneficial if the MoD reviews this programme and suitably recast its contents to meet the existing and emerging scenarios.
Reviewing promotion system
Controversial interviews relating to personal issues, the Raksha Mantri’s decision being challenged in the Apex Court and several other unseemly scandals have marred the army’s image and dragged the services into the cesspool of partisan and parochial politics. This has caused divisiveness and serious damage to the very fabric of our military. It is indeed most unfortunate that any questioning of the deviations from the well established norms is viewed as questioning the very loyalty of the entire army. Such incidents, which have a great adverse affect on the morale of the armed forces, must not be allowed to recur under any circumstances. Time has perhaps come to review the entire existing basis of promotions and appointments to the higher echelons in the three services.
The patriotism and professionalism of the men and women of our armed forces is second to none among the militaries the world over. Our national security concerns demand that all interests and all institutions of national power are brought to work most closely together to further the country’s interest and build a militarily and economically strong India which enjoys the trust and respect of all our neighbours. In conclusion, the country must come first, always and ever, and never forget “who lives if India dies.”
Refining Jointness
Continuing lack of consensus among the three services is thwarting the achievement of the vital objective of jointness
The military also has to be concerned about the consequences of the economic meltdown and the strong likelihood of the allocations for defence facing a significant decline
Higher defence management needs to maintain a sensitive balance between the civil and military components and ensure that the entire military apparatus functions strictly within the parameters of jointness
A dedicated security administration cadre should be established by drawing in the best available talent from the civil services, defence services, DRDO, science and technology, information and communication technology.